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A naturalist account of the limited, and hence reasonable,
effectiveness of mathematics in physics
Lee Smolin
My aim in this essay is to propose a conception of mathematics that is fully consonant
with naturalism. By that I mean the hypothesis that everything that exists is part of the
natural world, which makes up a unitary whole. This is in contradiction with the Platonic
view of mathematics held by many physicists and mathematicians according to which,
mathematical truths are facts about mathematical objects which exist in a separate, timeless realm
of reality, which exists apart from and in addition to physical reality.
If you are a Platonist the question of the relationship between mathematical truths
and true facts about nature concerns a hypothetical correspondence between two realms
of existence, physical reality and the Platonic realm of mathematical reality. The effec-
tiveness of mathematics in physics is in this context mysterious because proponents of
this view have failed to explain both how there could be such a correspondence and how
we, as beings trapped in time bound physical reality, can have certain knowledge of the
hypothesized separate realm of mathematical reality1.
If you are a Platonist, then I would argue you cannot be a naturalist, because you
believe that something exists apart from physical reality. At best you are a dualist. Simi-
larly, if you believe that the ultimate goal of physics is to discover a mathematical object,
O, which is in perfect correspondence with nature, such that every true fact about the uni-
verse, or its history, is isomorphic to a true fact aboutO, then you are also not a naturalist
because you not only believe in the existence of something which is not part of nature,
you believe that everything that is true about nature is explained by a true fact about
something which exists apart from nature. You are instead a kind of mystic, believing
in the prophetic power of the study of something which exists outside of time and apart
from nature.
If, on the other hand, all that exists is physical reality then mathematical knowledge
must be an aspect of knowledge about physical reality. The view I will propose answers
Wigner’s query about the ”unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in physics” by show-
ing that the role of mathematics within physics is reasonable, because it is limited. In partic-
ular, there is no mathematical object which is isomorphic to the universe as a whole, and
hence no perfect correspondence between nature and mathematics. There indeed may be
properties enjoyed by physical reality which have no counterpart in mathematics. I will
mention two below.
Mathematics thus has no prophetic role in physics, which would allow us an end run
around the hard slog of hypothesizing physical principles and theories and testing their
consequences against experiment. Mathematical beauty may inspire us, while remain-
1One radically simple approach to bridging this corespondence is the mathematical universe
hypothesis[1].
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ing, like most sources of beauty, apt to mislead us if intoxication becomes a substitute
for thought. Mathematics is nonetheless the second most important tool in our physi-
cists’ toolkit, after the methods of experiment and observation. Even if not every fact
about the natural world has a correspondence with a property of a mathematical object,
it is nonetheless important that many experimentally accessible facts about the natural
world can be predicted and explained by a process that involves modelling a physical ex-
periment in mathematical terms. So even a limited and partial correspondence between
mathematical results and the results of experiments challenges our attempts to account
for mathematics completely within a naturalist perspective.
At the same time attempts to formulate a non-Platonic foundations of mathematics
have been unsatisfactory, as they too fail to account for the effectiveness of mathematics
as a tool of physics. If mathematical truths are merely truths by convention or agreement,
how could it possibly be the case that they sometimes correspond to facts about nature?
So a new conception of mathematics is needed which is entirely naturalist and regards
mathematical truths as truths about nature. In this essay I sketch a proposal for such a
view. The key it turns out is the conception of time. I propose that to get a conception
of mathematics within naturalism it is essential to regard time as an essential aspect of
nature, in a sense to be specified shortly. I thus propose to call this new 2 view, temporal
naturalism[2].
This viewwhich has developed from an eight year collaborationwith RobertoMangabeira
Unger. It is presented more fully in our recently published book3, from which the follow-
ing is taken[3].
Mangabeira Unger and I hypothesize two principles which we take to define temporal
naturalism.
1. The singular universe: All that exists is part of a single, causally connected uni-
verse. The universe and its history have no copies, and are not part of any ensem-
ble. There is no other mode of existence, in particular neither a Platonic realm of
mathematical objects nor an ensemble of possible worlds exist apart from the single
universe.
2. The inclusive reality of time: All that is real or true is such within a moment, which
is one of a succession of moments. The activity of time is a process by which novel
events are generated out of a presently existing, thick set of present events. There
are no eternal laws; laws are subsidiary to time and to a fundamental activity of
causation and may evolve. There is an objective distinction between past, present
and future.
These principle are really nothing but a deepening of what it means to be a naturalist.
If all that exists is part of nature, then all chains of causation must refer back only to past
2Related explorations of the notion of naturalism are discussed in [6, 7, 8].
3 Mangabeira Unger also will have an essay in this competition[5] which presents a view complementary
to this one.
2
natural events. Moreover we adopt a strong form of Einstein’s principle of no unrecipro-
cated action according to which there can be no entity A which plays a role in explaining
an event B, that cannot itself be influenced by prior physical events. Among the things
that violate a strict definition of naturalism are explanations that refer to ideal, timeless
absolute elements such as absolute space and time, non-dynamical fixed background ge-
ometries, whether of spacetime or Hilbert space, or absolute, timeless laws, which are
imagined to act to cause things to happen in nature but are never themselves acted upon.
In the following I sketch a view of mathematics consistent with these principles within
which the necessary, but necessarily limited role of mathematics in physics is reasonable.
A new conception: mathematics as a study of evoked reality
According to the viewmost commonly held among physicists andmathematicians, math-
ematics is the study of a timeless but real realm of mathematical objects. This contradicts
our principles twice over, both because there is no real realm other than our one universe
and second because there is nothing real or true that is timeless.
The choice between whether mathematics is discovered or invented is a false choice.
Discovered implies something already exists and it also implies we have no choice about
what we find. Invented means did not exist before AND we have choice about what we
invent.
So these are not opposites. These are two out of four possibilities on a square whose
dimensions are whether an entity allows choice or not and whether it already exists or
not.
I would like to propose that there is a class of facts about the world, which concerns
structures and objects which come to exist at specific moments, which, nevertheless, have
rigid properties once they exist.
Let us call this possibility evoked. I would then propose that mathematics consists of
the study of certain of these evoked structures. The four possibilities are indicated in the
following diagram:
Existed prior? Y es No
Has rigid properties?
Y es Discovered Evoked
No. Fantasized Invented
There are many things that did not exist before we bring them into existence but about
which we have no choice, or only highly constrained choices, once it does exist. So the
notion of evocation applies to many things besides mathematics.
For example, there are an infinite number of games we might invent. We invent the
rules but, once invented, there is a set of possible plays of the game which the rules allow.
We can explore the space of possible games by playing them, and we can also in some
cases deduce general theorems about the outcomes of games.
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It feels like we are exploring a pre-existing territory as we often have little or no choice,
because there are often surprises and incredibly beautiful insights into the structure of the
game we created. But there is no reason to think that game existed before we invented
the rules. What could that even mean?
There are many other classes of things that are evoked. There are forms of poetry
and music that have rigid rules which define vast or countably infinite sets of possible
realizations. They were invented, it is absurd to think that haiku or the blues existed
before particular people made the first one. Once defined there are many discoveries
to be made exploring the landscape of possible realizations of the rules. A master may
experience the senses of discovery, beauty and wonder, but these are not arguments for
the prior or timeless existence of the art form independent of human creativity.
It just happens to be a true fact about the world that it is possible to invent novel
games, or forms which, once brought into existence, have constraints or rules which de-
fine a vast or infinite space of realizations.
When a game like chess is invented a whole bundle of facts become demonstrable,
some of which are theorems that become provable through straightforward mathematical
reasoning. As we do not believe in timeless Platonic realities, we do not want to say that
chess always existed-in our view of the world, chess came into existence at the moment
the rules were codified. This means we have to say that all the facts about it became not
only demonstrable, but true, at that moment as well. Our time bound world is just like
that: there are things that spring into existence, along with a large and sometimes even
infinite set of true properties. This is what the word evoked means to convey: the facts
about chess are evoked into existence by the invention of the game.
The concept of evoked truths depends essentially on the reality of time because it has
built into it the distinction between past, present and future.
Once evoked, the facts about chess are objective, in that if any one person can demon-
strate them, any one can. And they are independent of time or particular context, so long
as it is after the invention of chess makes it possible to discuss them. Furthermore, these
facts are facts about our one world, just the same as facts about how many legs some in-
sect has or which species can fly. The latter facts were evoked by evolution acting through
natural selection, the facts about chess were evoked by the invention of the game as a step
in the evolution of human culture.
One consequence of the Platonic view is to deny the possibility of novelty. No game,
construction or theorem is ever new because anything that humans discover or invent
existed already timelessly in the Platonic realm. The alternative to believing in the time-
less reality of any logically possible game or species is believing in the reality of novelty.
Things come into existence and facts become true all the time. This is one meaning of the
reality of time. Nature has within it the capacity to create kinds of events, or processes or
forms which have no prior precedent. We human beings can partake of this ability by the
evokation of novel games and mathematical systems.
So it is not just human beings that have the power to evoke novel structures, which
bring along with them novel facts. Nature has this capacity as well and uses it on a range
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of scales from the emergence of novel phenomena which are describe by novel laws to the
emergence of novel biological species which play novel games to dominate novel niches.
The notion of novel patterns or games evoked into existence gives a precise meaning
to the concept of emergence. In a timeless world emergence is always at best an approx-
imate and inessential description because one can always descend to the timeless funda-
mental level of description according to which all that happens is the rearrangement of
particles with timeless properties under timeless laws. But once we admit the actuality
of the emergence of novel games and structures with evoked properties, emergence has a
fundamental, irreducible meaning.
In fact, biological evolution proceeds by a sequence of evokings of novel games and
structures. Once cells with DNA and the standard biochemistry come into existence a
vast landscape of possible species and ecologies opens up. As the biosphere evolves it
discovers many niches where species may thrive. New innovations appear from time
to time like eukaryotic cells, multi-cellularity, oxygen breathing, plants etc, which define
further constraints which in turn make possible new variations, niches and innovations.
All this is truly a wonder but it would add nothing and explain nothing to posit that
there is a timeless platonic world of possible DNA sequences, species, niches, ecologies
that are being realized. Such a belief would explain nothing about how the real biosphere
evolves and raise many additional questions whose answers, if they had answers, would
add nothing to our understanding of the history of life or allow us to predict features of
future life any more that we already can.
What applies to biology also applies to mathematics. There is a potential infinity of
FAS’s (formal axiomatic systems). Once one is evoked it can be explored and there are
many discoveries to be made about it. But that statement does not imply that it, or all the
infinite number of possible formal axiomatic systems. existed before they were evoked.
Indeed, its hard to think what belief in the prior existence of a FAS would add. Once
evoked, some FAS have an infinite number of properties which can be discovered or
proved, about which there is no choice. But the postulate that this FAS existed before
being evoked would not explain the existence of those true properties because it involves
belief in something that itself needs explanation. If the FAS existed prior or timelessly,
what brought it into existence? How can something exist now but also exist timelessly.
For if it only existed ”outside time”, would could we, who are time-bound, and only come
into contact with other things that live in time, ever know of it? How can something exist
and not be made of matter? How can something that is not made of matter be known
about, explored or influence us, who are made of matter?
So the postulation of prior or timeless existence explains nothing that is not explained
by the notion of being evoked. It raises several questions including the ones just men-
tioned that are even more difficult to answer, and which centuries of attempts by very
bright people have not answered.
Since the notion of evocation is sufficient to explain why a FAS once evoked has rigid
properties to be discovered, the notion of prior or timeless existence is not helpful. And
it requires us to believe in a whole class of existence, as well as belief in the existence of
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an infinite number of FAS’s, for which there is no evidence. By Occam’s razor, this is not
plausible.
Barry Mazur, in a very helpful essay[9], asserts that any answer to Platonism has to
say something about the nature of proof. First of all, proof is a specialization of rational
argument. It is a true fact about the world of possibilities brought into being when we
humans evolved that in many situations we can rely on rational argument to lead to
unambiguous conclusions. It happens to be the case that there are classes of questions
that can be decided unambiguously by rational argument based on public evidence.
This fact of the reliability of rational deduction cannot be explained by pointing to an
imagined world of timeless but existing logical forms, as that would raise more unan-
swerable questions of the above kind. So it has to be taken as a simple brute fact about
the world that experience has long validated.
The process of rational deduction has itself been formalized, so rational argument
from evidence is also a formal game whose rules have been defined in a way that in some
classes of questions defines constraints sufficient to lead to unambiguous conclusions.
Among these classes are mathematical systems defined by rules, or FAS’s. Proofs are
first of all just instances of rational argument applied to FAS’s to deduce true properties
of them. Once evoked a FAS has many, often an infinite number of true properties that
can be so established.
Proofs can be formalized, and there may be different ways of doing that. Each for-
malization is itself a formal game which is evoked, after which it can also be studied and
explored. One can then raise and answer questions about how different formal methods
of proof are related to each other.
The bottom line is this: we have a choice between simple wonder and mystification.
We can wonder at the vast complexity and beauty that is created by novel games, ideas,
formal systems, etc when they are evoked. That there is such possibility of novel systems
to explore is a true fact about the world we find ourselves in, which is properly a source
of wonder.
Or we can make mystical pronouncements that attempt to explain the infinite possi-
bilities that might be evoked by imagining they all exist in a timeless reality apart from
what we see physically exists around us. But these mystical beliefs add nothing and
explain nothing and indeed, as indicated above, involve us in a pile of questions that, un-
like questions about mathematics, cannot be answered by rational argument from public
evidence. Moreover, to assert that one’s avocation is the exploration of some timeless un-
physical reality is presumptuous and seems like a claim to special knowledge or authority
that, in fact, contradicts the fact that mathematical arguments are just finely disciplined
cases of the usual rational thinking that all humans constantly engage in to understand
their world.
Honest wonder about our world seems a better stance than mysticism, especially
when what is involved is the highest form of rational creativity. For that reason it seems
better to believe in the possibility of evocation to create novel realms of truth to be ex-
plored that did not exist before than to believe in a special ability to gain knowledge
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about a timeless realm disconnected from physical existence.
The reasonable effectiveness of mathematics in physics
So the answer to Wigner’s question is that mathematics is reasonably effective in physics,
which is to say that, where ever it is effective, there is reason for it. But mathematics does
not of itself lead to discoveries about nature, nor is physics the search for a mathematical
object isomorphic to the world or its history. There will never be discovered a mathemat-
ical object whose study can render unnecessary the experimental study of nature; there
is no mathematical discovery in our future that will render moot from then on the ex-
perimental and observational basis of science. It will always be the case that the use of
mathematics to model nature will be partial-because no mathematical object is a perfect
match for nature. The use of mathematics in nature also involves a large degree of arbi-
trariness, because those mathematical objects that provide partial mirrors of parts of the
world are a small, finite subset of the potentially infinite number of mathematical objects
that might be evoked. So the effectiveness of mathematics in physics is limited to what is
reasonable.
Moreover, any view about the role of mathematics in physics has to deal with the
troubling issue of underdetermination of the choice of mathematical models of physical
systems. Most mathematical laws used in physics do not uniquely model the phenomena
they describe. In most cases the equation describing the law could be complicated by
the addition of extra terms, consistent with the symmetries and principles expressed,
whose effects are merely too small too measure given state of the art technology. These
“correction terms” may be ignored because they don’t measurably affect the predictions,
but only complicate the analysis. That this is the right thing to do methodologicaly does
not, however, change the fact, that every one of the famous equations we use is merely
the simplest of a bundle of possible forms of the laws which express the same ideas,
symmetries and principles, and have the same empirical content.
This fact of under-determination is a real problem for those views which assert that
nature is mathematical or that there is a mathematical object which is an exact mirror
of nature, for only one out of the bundle of equations can be the true reality or mirror.
Often we assert that the right one is the simplest, evoking a necessarily mystical faith in
“the simplicity of nature.” The problem is that it never turns out to be the case that the
simplest version of a law is the right one. If we wait long enough we always discover that
the simplest version is in fact wrong, because the theory is superseded by a new theory.
The old equation turns out still to hold approximately, but with corrections which take a
form that could not have been guessed or anticipated prior to the invention of the new
theory.
Thus, Newton’s laws were found to be corrected by terms from special relativity, and
then corrected again by terms from general relativity. Maxwell’s equations received cor-
rections that describe light scattering from light-a quantum effect that could have been
modelled-but never anticipated-by Maxwell. And so on.
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The radical under determinacy of the mathematical representation of physics is how-
ever no problem for the view proposed here. It is rather exactly what you would expect, if
mathematics is a powerful tool for modelling data and discovering approximate and ul-
timately temporary regularities which emerge from large amalgamations of elementary
unique events. In this context we use the simplest equation that expresses a law, not be-
cause we believe nature is simple but because it is a convenience for us-it makes a better
tool, much as a hammer with a handle moulded to the hand is a better tool, Moreover in
this context every theory is an effective theory which means that the limitations on the
domain of applicability are always explicit and the correction terms are always there and
ready to be exploited when a boundary of the domain of applicability is approached.
The reasonable effectiveness of mathematics in mathematics
A satisfactory view of mathematics must also explain the unreasonable effectiveness of
mathematics in mathematics itself. Why do developments in the elaboration of one core
concept-say number, so often turn out to yield insight into another-say geometry? Why
does algebra turn out to be so powerful a tool in the study of topology? Why do the
different division algebras organize the classification of the possible symmetry groups of
continuous geometries? If mathematics is just the free exploration of arbitrary ideas and
axiom systems, why do these explorations so often intersect, and why are these intersec-
tions so productive of insight?
A short answer is that the contents of mathematics is far from arbitrary-while an in-
finite number of mathematical objects might potentially be envoked- the few that prove
interesting develop a very small number of core concepts. These core concepts are not
arbitrary-they are elaborations of structures which are discovered during the study of
nature.
There are four of these core concepts: number, geometry, algebra and logic. They each
capture a key aspect of the world and our interaction with it. Number captures the fact
that the world contains distinguishable objects which can be counted. Geometry captures
the fact that objects are found to take up space and form shapes. Algebra captures the
fact that objects and number can be transformed, by processes carried out in time. And
logic is the distillation of the fact that we can reason about the first three concepts, and so
deduce predictions for future observations from properties of past observations.
The bulk of mathematics consists of elaborations of these four core concepts. In the
course of these elaborations we often find developments of one bear on another. These
intersections tell us that these concepts go back to nature, which is a unity. For exam-
ple, the elaboration of the concepts of space and number often intersect because space
and number are both features of nature and hence are highly inter-related from the start.
Hence, the discovery that a relation among numbers represents or is isomorphic to a re-
lation amongst another strand of mathematics, is often a discovery of a relation that is a
true property of the one world.
There is no necessity to limit the study of mathematical systems to those that elaborate
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these four core concepts. But those that do display a vast richness of consequences and
interconnections exactly because they are elaborations of core concepts that come from
nature.
One may then even define mathematics as the study of systems of evoked relation-
ships inspired by observations of nature. Mathematics is then a system of objective facts,
that is nonetheless timebound and open to unpredictable developments in the future
Conclusion
If we give up the idea that there is a mathematical object existing in a timeless Platonic
realm which is isomorphic to the history of the universe, we still have to explain why
mathematics is so effective in physics. It will be sufficient to point to an interpretation
of the use of mathematics in physics that is consistent with the view of mathematics just
presented. Here is one such interpretation: mathematics is useful as providing models that
summarize the content of records of past observations. When we test a theory we make and
record observations of motions, which consist of values of observables that we represent
as the coordinates of the configuration space of a system. These records are static, in
that once taken they do not change in time. Or, more precisely, they may change, by
being degraded or erased, but once they do they cease to function as records of past
experiments. They can be compared to a trajectory in the configuration space which,
being a mathematical object, is also static.
We can propose that the main effectiveness of mathematics in physics consists of these
kinds of correspondences between records of past observations or, more precisely, pat-
terns inherent in such records, and properties of mathematical objects that are constructed
as representations of models of the evolution of such systems. This view does not require
either the postulation that physical reality is timeless or that mathematical objects exist
in a separate timeless realm. It is sufficient that records of past observations are static
and that the properties of a mathematical object are, once evoked into existence by their
invention, static. Both the records and the mathematical objects are human constructions
which are brought into existence by exercises of human will, neither has any transcen-
dental existence. Both are static, not in the sense of existing outside of time, but in the
weak sense that once they come to exist, they don’t change.
In closing, I would like to mention two properties enjoyed by the physical universe
which are not isomorphic to any property of a mathematical object.
1. In the real universe it is always some present moment, which is one of a succession
of moments. Properties off mathematical objects, once evoked, are true independent
of time.
2. The universe exists apart from being evoked by the human imagination, while
mathematical objects do not exist before and apart from being evoked by human
imagination.
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